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Summary. — When both slits of the double slit experiment are open, closing one
paradoxically increases the detection rate at some points on the detection screen.
Feynman famously warned that temptation to “understand” such a puzzling feature
only draws us into blind alleys. Nevertheless, we gain insight into this feature by
drawing an analogy between the double slit experiment and a time reversed fire
alarm. Much as closing the slit increases probability of a future detection, ruling
out fire drill scenarios, having heard the fire alarm, increases probability of a past
fire (using Bayesian inference). Classically, Bayesian inference is associated with
computing probabilities of past events. We therefore identify this feature of the
double slit experiment with a time reversed thermodynamic arrow. We believe
that much of the enigma of quantum mechanics is simply due to some variation
of time’s arrow. In further support of this, we employ a plausible formulation of
the thermodynamic arrow to derive an uncertainty in classical mechanics that is
reminiscent of quantum uncertainty.
PACS 03.65.Ta – Foundations of quantum mechanics; measurement theory.
PACS 05.20.-y – Classical statistical mechanics.
1. – Introduction
Facile views on time’s arrow in physics impede progress in foundations of quantum
mechanics. Consider the key role played by Bell’s theorem, and the EPR experiments
that followed, in shifting physicists’ views on fundamental physics. Bell’s theorem pivots
heavily on the assumption of a unidirectional causal arrow of time(1). Yet, most physi-
cists claim that their views on fundamental physics are time symmetric. There is some
insincerity in either this claim of a time symmetric view or in the conclusions drawn
(∗) Accepted March 2010 for publication in Il Nuovo Cimento B. The original publication will
be available at http://www.sif.it/SIF/en/portal/journals
(∗∗) halabit@radonc.ucsf.edu
(1) This is a major theme of [1] in which Price writes: “the theorem requires the assumption
that the values of hidden variables are statistically independent of future measurement settings.”
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from the EPR episode. The perceived innocence of Bell’s assumption of a unidirectional
casual arrow of time is rooted in physicists’ continued stigma of the grandfather paradox.
But hasn’t this stigma been removed by Wheeler and Feynman [2] and Schulman [3, 4]
already?
We first began to suspect a role for a variant of time’s arrow in quantum mechanics
when considering the following peculiarity:
Quantum theory’s prediction of the grotesque superpositions of the cat para-
dox is as outlandish as the experiment it prescribes to empirically confirm
their existence: interference measurement of macroscopic superposition.
If these interference measurements can be seen as giving rise to the superpositions
they are designed to confirm, then the absence of grotesque superpositions from our
experience can be attributed to the impracticality of these measurements. This would
require a reversed causal arrow of time: the absence (presence) of future interference
measurement prevents (allows) present states that evolve into macroscopic superposition.
Are we not free to choose any initial state we desire? Is it then not contradictory to
allow the future to influence our freely chosen initial state? We submit that we do have
choice over the “course grain” or macrostate attributes of the initial state but not the
finer microstate.
In support of this, Schulman [5] has shown that it is always possible to fine tune
present quantum states of system and environment so that they evolve clear of grotesque
superposition. These fine tuned “special” initial microstates are very rare relative to
ones that do evolve into grotesque superposition. Schulman’s argument is consequently
against the fundamental postulate of statistical mechanics, that of assigning equal a priori
probability to all microstates of a given macrostate. In the context of classical mechanics
we already know, however, that the practice of assuming equal a priori probability for
the microstates is apparently valid when projecting into the future but not into the past
[6]. This same practice is used in Boltzman’s statistical argument for the second law of
thermodynamics but, as is well known, incorrectly leads to the conclusion of a higher
entropy past when projecting backwards in time.
Schulman is therefore inclined to attribute the restriction to “special” initial states
to a final boundary condition, that the universe not be in macroscopic superposition in
the distant future. Along with a similiar inital boundary condition in the distant past
these are called the “two time boundary condition”.
The retreat to an ad hoc boundary condition is rooted in the simple observation
that most of the dynamical laws that we are aware of, such as Newton’s second law or
Maxwell’s equations, impose no restrictions on the initial state. In passing, however,
we point out one exception to this in the literature: in the “shutter” example [2] of
Wheeler-Feynman absorber theory the shutter’s initial state is restricted by the theory’s
dynamics.
Much of the above represents the basic encounters a physicist makes with the subject
of time’s arrow when seriously contemplating the measurement problem. The next two
sections examine more complex illustrations of the connection between these two themes.
They attempt to answer the following question: how much of the enigma of quantum
mechanics is merely that of time’s arrow or variations thereof? In section 2 we obtain
an unavoidable uncertainty in classical mechanics, reminiscent of quantum uncertainty,
by exploring a plausible formulation of the thermodynamic arrow. In section 3 the
enigmatic feature of the double slit experiment (viewed forward in time) is shown to be
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that of classical Bayesian inference of the past. Section 2 is not required reading for
section 3 and the reader may begin with the latter.
Caves et al. [8] have reached similar conclusions on the prominence of Bayesianism
in quantum mechanics although through a starkly different path than ours. We contrast
their approach with ours in Appendix A.
2. – Unavoidable uncertainty in time symmetric classical mechanics
Just as unavoidable uncertainty is associated with quantum mechanics, unavoidable
uncertainty would also arise in classical mechanics if the thermodynamic arrow of time
is generalized.
The most conventional formulation of a thermodynamic arrow is obtained by requiring
a single initial boundary condition that the system be in a (low entropy) macrostate 0
at a past time t = 0. Schulman [9] employs a more time symmetric framework by also
including a final boundary condition, that the system be in macrostate T at time t = T .
The thermodynamic arrow then results from the stipulation that the time, t, at which
we currently find our universe satisfies 0 < t T . The probability that the system is in
a macrostate ∆α at such a time is then given by:
ρα =
µ(φ(t)(0) ∩∆α ∩ φ(t−T )(T ))
µ(φ(t)(0) ∩ φ(t−T )(T )) ,(1)
where φt(·) is a measure preserving evolution of all phase space points in (·), and µ(·)
represents the measure (phase space volume) of (·).
Knowing that the magnitude of t − T is large, we assume perfect mixing to obtain
the following approximation: µ(A ∩ φ(t−T )(B)) = µ(A)µ(B), where A and B are any
macrostates. Equation 1 then becomes
ρα =
µ(φt(0) ∩∆α)
µ(0)
.(2)
From this equation one sees how the future conditioning T has no effect on the present
probability distribution of macrostates. The future conditioning does, however, restrict
the set of microstates (2).
From this point, Schulman goes on to derive the causal arrow of time [9]. His remark-
able derivation will not be reproduced here, but the reader is strongly encouraged to
consult the original reference [9]. In passing, we note that his is ultimately a derivation
of our profound inability to remember the future. Remembering the future requires a
time reversed causal arrow since a present memory (effect) must precede the memorable
event (cause).
Assume, for simplicity, that all macrostates have the same measure and choose units
such that: µ(∆α) = 1, ∀α. To further simplify our analysis we assume the special case
whereby
φt(0) = φ
t(0) ∩ (∆1 ∪∆2),(3)
(2) This is reminiscent of the EPR experiment in which the future’s effect is concealed in hidden
variables. Here it is concealed in microstate variables.
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i.e. ∆1 and ∆2 are exhaustive. From equations 2 and 3 we have:
ρ1 = s ≡ µ(φ
t(0) ∩∆1)
µ(0)
,
ρ2 = 1− s.(4)
The entropy, given equations 4, is:
Z = −s ln(s)− (1− s)ln(1− s).(5)
Its plot is shown in Figure 1 (case of p = 1).
Quantum experiments are marked by the high precision with which one seeks to
determine the state of the system. Such circumstances motivate us to consider µ(φt(0)∩
∆α) so small as to have not undergone any mixing by time T . In other words, we now
assume that φt(0)∩∆α is either evolved whole into T by φT−t, in which case we have:
φt(0) ∩∆α ∩ φt−T (T ) = φt(0) ∩∆α(6)
or it evolves whole outside of T , in which case we have:
φt(0) ∩∆α ∩ φt−T (T ) = ∅.(7)
We regard the former as having a probability p, and the latter, 1−p. Under the incomplete
(in fact, none at all) mixing now assumed, we regard the probability of partial evolution
of the very small φt(0) ∩∆α into T as zero.
We will show that these simple assumptions of no mixing introduce bounds on the
probabilities, prohibiting both ρ1 and ρ2 from reaching 1 or 0. We will use a superscript
b (“bound” or “blurred”) to indicate quantities for which these effects of incomplete
mixing are being accounted for. For example, we will derive a lower bound on Zb, which
we regard as an unavoidable uncertainty (for our special case) in classical mechanics.
We first note that there are 4 scenarios to consider: (1) both φt(0)∩∆1 and φt(0)∩
∆2 evolve into T , (2) the former does, but the latter does not, etc. The probability
distribution corresponding with scenario (1) is the same as that given by equations 4
(see equations 1, 3, 6). Note that each scenario’s probability distribution is computed
using the general equation 1 since we no longer assume perfect mixing. For scenario (2),
we have ρ1 = 1, ρ2 = 0 (see equations 1, 3, 6, 7), and so on. The scenario in which neither
evolves into T must be dismissed since it conflicts with our initial and final boundary
conditions. Our method is to compute the probability distribution for each individual
scenario and average over them (weighted by each scenario’s probability). The result
(see Table I) is:
ρb1 =
1− p(1− s)
2− p ,
ρb2 =
1− ps
2− p .(8)
Neither ρb1 nor ρ
b
2 can reach unity or zero even in the limit s → 0, 1. Note from the
“denominator” row of Table I that our analysis is not defined at s = 0, 1, hence the limit.
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Fig. 1. – Plot of the entropy under no mixing, Zb, for the case α = 1, 2 (given by equation 9).
When p = 1 plot reduces to that of perfect mixing (equation 5).
Table I. – Summary of calculations for ρb1 and ρ
b
2. Equation 3 was used in obtaining denominator
of equation 1.
scenario ∆1 In, ∆2 In ∆1 In, ∆2 Out ∆1 Out, ∆2 In
probability
p
2−p
1−p
2−p
1−p
2−p
numerator of eq.
1 for ∆1
µ(φt(0) ∩∆1) µ(φt(0) ∩∆1) 0
numerator of eq.
1 for ∆2
µ(φt(0) ∩∆2) 0 µ(φt(0) ∩∆2)
denominator of
eq. 1
µ(0) µ(φ
t(0) ∩∆1) µ(φt(0) ∩∆2)
contribution to
ρb1
p
2−ps
1−p
2−p 0
contribution to
ρb2
p
2−p (1− s) 0 1−p2−p
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Our claim is that (for fixed p) there is a fixed non-zero lower bound on ρb1 for arbitrarily
small but non-zero s. This bound on our certainty was not exhibited by equations 4 for
the case of perfect mixing.
The entropy of ρb is:
Zb = ln(2− p)− 1− p(1− s)
2− p ln (1− p(1− s))−
1− ps
2− p ln(1− ps).(9)
We see that Z of equation 5 is the special case p = 1 of equation 9 for Zb. Figure 1
shows that the minimums of Zb are always at s→ 0, 1. In this limit equation 9 provides
the following lower bound:
Zb ≥ ln(2− p)− 1− p
2− pln(1− p).(10)
This lower bound was zero for the special case of perfect mixing.
Qualitatively, then, our uncertainty principle can be stated as follows. There exists
a fixed bound on our certainty that the system will be in ∆2, even in the limit of
experiments designed to have all phase space points in 0 evolve into ∆2.
3. – The double slit experiment and the time reversed fire alarm
Let one of the two slits of the double slit experiment be open and the other closed. If
the closed slit is opened the detection frequency at some points on the detection screen
will paradoxically decrease. Although generally regarded as one of the most puzzling
features of quantum mechanics, we now show that this is merely a feature of a reversed
thermodynamic arrow of time.
As early as 1975, Schulman [6] showed that the thermodynamic arrow can be equiva-
lently stated as the difference between instructions for calculating probabilities of future
evolutions and those of past evolutions. Let Ai be a macroscopic state comprising a re-
gion of phase space having measure µ(Ai), and let the equal a priori probability density
at any point in this region be ρia = 1/µ(A
i). Given that the system is in state Ai at
time s we are instructed to assume that ρia holds when calculating the probability of the
system being in a state Aj at time t > s. This conditional probability is computed by:
P (Ajt |Ais)
(t>s)
= ρiaµ(A
j ∩ φ(t−s)(Ai)),(11)
where the subscript on a state A indicates the time at which the system is found in
this state, and φ(t−s) is a measure preserving evolution of all phase space points in its
argument from time s to t.
On the other hand, when calculating probabilities of evolutions into the past we are
instructed not to use ρia. Schulman suggests, instead, to use Bayesian inference. First,
hypothesize an a priori probability distribution qj over the macroscopic states at an
earlier time t < s (s is present time) from which the system may have evolved. Given
the present state, Ais, the probability of a past (time t) state is then computed from:
P (Ajt |Ais)
(t<s)
=
P (Ais|Ajt )qj
N
,(12)
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where P (Ais|Ajt ) can be computed using equation 11, and 1/N is a normalization factor
given by:
N
(t<s)≡
∑
k
P (Ais|Akt )qk.(13)
We intend to compare the above classical calculation of probabilities of past states
with the calculation of probabilities of future detections in the double slit experiment.
Increase P (Ais|Amt )qm by an amount ∆m ≥ 0, ∀m. This corresponds in our analogy with
the double slit experiment to opening the closed slit. It is clear that this may decrease
the expression in equation 12 which corresponds to a detection probability in the double
slit experiment.
The feature considered here need not be understood through the above equations and
is, in fact, frequently experienced on a day to day basis.
I was recently working at my desk when the fire alarm began sounding. I momentarily
feared that a fire had triggered the alarm. A few seconds later, I remembered receiving
an email warning us about a drill scheduled that day, and so concluded–implicitly using
Bayesian inference– that there was no fire. The conventional perspective in physics says
that the fire drill merely introduced another mechanism by which the alarm could have
been triggered and so could not have reduced the probability of the fire. This conventional
perspective inconspicuously forbids placing boundary conditions, such as the sounding of
the alarm, after the event whose probability is to be calculated: to rule out the effect of
scheduling the drill on the probability of a fire one must examine all scenarios in which
the drill was and was not scheduled, including those for which there was no alarm. In its
(inconspicuous) prohibition of final boundary conditions this conventional perspective
is time asymmetric, and I discard it– at mortal risk– in insisting on considering the
sounding of the alarm as a boundary condition.
For a careful breakdown of the analogy, Figure 2 recounts the fire alarm in reverse
order relative to the double slit experiment. Having heard a fire alarm, there are two
trajectories the universe can take into a past in which an unintended fire had started.
One, in which the fire alarm is triggered by the fire, and another in which the alarm
is triggered by a fire drill serendipitously scheduled on the day of the fire. These two
trajectories into a past in which an unintended fire had started are analogous to the
particle trajectories through the two slits into a future in which the aforementioned
detection occurs. To see the analogy imagine we are uncertain of the existence of the
fire. When trajectories involving a scheduled drill are ruled out, the probability of the
unintended fire rises (through Bayesian inference), much as the detection probability
rises when one of the slits is closed.
4. – Discussion
Most agree that the two main themes of this paper, quantum measurement and time’s
arrow, are subtle topics. Attention to subtlety in physics is, to some extent, compromised
by the larger emphasis some place on issues that more directly impact on theory’s ability
to correctly predict empirical results.
A subtle coincidence in Newtonian theory is the similar results one obtains when one
either applies an acceleration to an observer’s frame of reference, or applies a uniform
gravitational field to the observer’s background. This subtle coincidence bore no direct
impact whatsoever on Newtonian theory’s ability to correctly predict empirical results.
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Fig. 2. – Analogy between double slit experiment and (time reverse of) fire alarm. Events labeled
by the same letter are analogous.
Yet, we know that consideration of this coincidence led to general relativity. In a moment
we allude again to how subtle connections made between electric and magnetic fields,
fluids, and light motivated the discovery that light is an electromagnetic wave.
Some in science are delighted by the unfamiliar and are happy to embrace it. Feyn-
man’s attitude towards quantum mechanics is a good example. Others view science as
the constant quest to understand initially unfamiliar phenomena by associating them
with the more familiar. An extreme example in this group are Pythagoreans(3).
History is replete with examples of the success of this latter view. We are all aware
of Newton’s successful attempt to understand the unfamiliar trajectory of planets using
that of apples. We are also aware that common features that electromagnetism and light
share with the familiar fluids, led to the discovery that light is an electromagnetic field.
Feynman [10, chap. 6], [11, chap. 3] claims that while we have grown accustomed
to understanding foreign phenomena by associating them with the more familiar, this
recipe will not work in quantum mechanics. It is largely the enigmatic feature of the
double slit experiment, discussed in section 3, that drives him to this claim. That we
were able to understand this enigmatic feature in terms of familiar, albeit time reversed,
scenarios of a fire alarm, contradicts Feynman’s claim.
(3) According to legend, Pythagoreans were so convinced that all phenomena in the universe
can be reduced to whole numbers and their ratios that they threw Hippasus, the discoverer of
irrational numbers, overboard while out at sea. Thousands of years later Pythagoreans were
somewhat vindicated: the very successful Dedekind cuts have provided a definition of irrational
numbers that appeals only to (the more familiar) rational numbers.
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Another feature that mystified Feynman was disappearance of the interference pattern
when the electron’s position is measured at the slits. Some insight into this feature can
be gained from section 2. Probability distributions were added non-distructively in that
section only under the assumption that points in ∆1 are sufficiently displaced in phase
space from points in ∆2 such that their probabilities of evolving into T are independent.
Probabilities of points within the same ∆ to evolve into T , however, are correlated.
In other words, probability distributions are added non-distructively only when the
paths are initially sufficiently displaced to expect a butterfly effect. When electron po-
sition is not measured at the slits it is not unreasonable to expect that the course of
the universe is not ultimately altered by which slit the electron passes through, so long
as it reaches the same place on the detection screen. Probability distributions of paths
through each slit may no longer then be added non-destructively as was done is sec-
tion 2. A measurement of which slit the electron passes through entails that the world
macroscopically changes depending on the measurement result. A butterfly effect is then
expected and the probability distributions can be added non-destructively.
∗ ∗ ∗
I am grateful to Michael Thorn and David Miller for useful discussions and comments.
Appendix A.
Strict Bayesianism
In strict Bayesianism, probabilities are not defined in terms of measurement frequen-
cies, but as degrees of belief. Caves et al. [8] utilize a definition of probability, which
they call dutch book consistency, that makes no mention of measured frequencies. They
also maintain that quantum states represent states of knowledge as opposed to objective
states. Accounting for the absence of superposition (indefinite) outcomes of measure-
ment is then less problematic since the state vector is not objective. Finally, the chief
challenge of Bayesianism, the search for methods to translate information into proba-
bility assignments, is fortuitously resolved by Gleason’s theorem [7]. For these reasons,
they argue, Bayesianism is especially well suited for quantum probabilities.
We, on the other hand, do not think it is necessary to abandon the concept of an
objective state. We pointed out in section 1 that the absence of superposition outcomes
of measurements is due to the two time boundary condition. We have yet, though, to
account for Born’s rule.
Consider the ensemble {pi, ψi} of possible states of system and environment. Let
the only assumption we make about the distribution in this ensemble be that it only
include states that satisfy the two time boundary condition. Presumably then, pi will
be zero for non-“special” states. We define a density matrix based on this ensemble. In
the ensemble basis, Born’s rule follows simply from the definition of the density matrix
itself. Born’s rule need only be accounted for for measurements in other bases. But
the two time boundary condition leads us to believe that the ensemble basis is always
the measurement basis itself (that states always happen to evolve into one of the basis
vectors of ensuing measurements). And so Born’s rule is accounted for.
The weakness in our argument is that the above density matrix, which incorporates
restriction to special states, is not the conventionally used density matrix. We view the
latter as a course grain representation of the former. The weakness then is our assumption
that while the final boundary condition obviously influences evolution of the ensemble,
it does not influence evolution of the density matrix derived from this ensemble: that
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the course grained and primitive density matrices undergo the same evolution. This
weakness is currently being addressed in an independent research effort.
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